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When President Donald Trump began his second term, there was considerable speculation about what role the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) would play in his national security policy toward Africa and whether he would even reduce it from an independent combatant command to the status of a sub-command within the US European Command. Statements from Trump’s Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, and congressional testimony this summer from both the outgoing head of AFRICOM, General Michael Langley, and Trump’s nominee as his successor, General Dagvin Anderson, however, reveal that not only will AFRICOM retain its current status, but it will play an increasingly central role of the Trump administration’s policy.
On 11 February 2025, President Donald Trump’s Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, visited the headquarters of the US Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany. He began his day doing physical training with Green Berets, then met with the commanders of European Command (EUCOM) and AFRICOM getting high-level briefings “on threats ranging from militants in Africa to Russia’s war in Ukraine,” and ended his day with a news conference on the Pentagon’s “force posturing priorities on the European and African continents.”[1]
Hegseth declared that AFRICOM would continue to play a key role in US national security policy. “That’s a mission very much worth resourcing,” he said. “Africa is very much on the front lines of a fight from Islamists to Christian populations that are under siege in Africa and have been ignored for far too long and American interests there. It matters a great deal. And Islamists—we’re not going to allow them to maintain a foothold, especially to try to strike at America.”[2]
When asked about the threat of armed jihadist groups in Africa and US concerns about the possibility that they might launch attacks in other parts of the world, Hegseth responded by saying that he was “...definitely concerned. I mean, anybody of our—anybody of my generation that served in Iraq and Afghanistan or have been a part of post-9/11 understands the threat of global jihad, especially the desire to export that against our allies in Europe or Israel or certainly the United States. So, the counterterrorism threat focused on those who would seek to do us harm is of the highest priority, which is why you saw what AFRICOM did so well in that strike in Somalia,” authorized by President Trump on 1 February 2025. Hegseth went on to say that “where we see those growing, plotting, or planning with increased capabilities we will strike. And that pertains to Islamist organizations all across the continent.”[3]
As these statements clearly illustrate, Trump and Hegseth’s biggest concern is what they perceive as the threat of Islamist attacks being launched from Africa on the United States, or on the citizens and interests of the United States and its allies. Al-Qaeda did attack the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, but the armed Islamist groups based in Africa have confined their operations to the continent and have conspicuously avoided targeting Americans, US government agencies, or private US commercial operations.
These statements also reflect the Trump administration’s repeated expressions of concern about what they perceived as the threat of violence and persecution towards Christians in Africa and the lack of protection that African governments provide to their Christian citizens. For example, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Brian J. Mast (Republican of Florida) held a hearing on “Conflict and Persecution in Nigeria: The Case for a CPC [Country of Particular Concern] Designation” on 12 March 2025, to hear testimony from representatives of the Catholic Church, the Family Research Council, the government-funded Wilson Center, and the Center for Religious Freedom at the Hudson Institute.
When General Dagvin Anderson, US Air Force, President Trump’s nominee as the next commander of AFRICOM appeared before a hearing held by the US Senate Armed Services Committee to consider his appointment, he declared in his opening statement that:
“as the Commander of Special Operations Africa (SOCAF), I witnessed how Africa—strategically positioned between the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific—is increasingly at the convergence of great-power rivalry and terrorism. China is expanding its approach from a focus on economic influence to greater military and information operations. Russia’s actions are frequently destabilizing and run counter to US interests. Terrorist networks continue to exploit ungoverned spaces, posing a direct threat to our safety and security.”[4]
General Anderson told the committee that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth:
“has given US AFRICOM two overarching priorities: prevent terrorist groups in Africa from exporting threats to the United States and to deter Chinese military advances across the continent. I will work to place pressure on terrorists with the intent and capability to threaten the homeland and work to improve indications and warnings of emerging threats. Additionally, I will task assigned forces to take actions that undermine any Chinese malign intent throughout the continent.”[5]
And, he went on to say, “US AFRICOM would need to consider the effects of Russia’s destabilizing activity on the continent and how it impacts US interests and military requirements.” Russia, Anderson stated,
“seeks to systematically counter Western interests and bolster its influence through military/intelligence cooperation, arms sales, and energy partnerships. Moscow sees Africa as a vehicle necessary for its own success centered on developing the partnerships necessary for its vision of a multipolar world, while also presenting an opportunity for Russia to extract natural resources, weaken the West’s dominance of global governance, and recognize economic opportunities for Russian companies, particularly those closed off to Western markets because of sanctions.”[6]
According to Anderson, “Russian military and security advisers currently do not pose a direct military threat to US personnel, but Russian deployments and influence organizations severely limit US AFRICOM’s placement and access throughout the region, inhibiting campaign effectiveness.” For Anderson, “Russia's pursuit of a permanent military presence and the deployment of Russian military and paramilitary personnel across Africa undermines democratic norms, destabilizes vulnerable security environments, disrupts UN missions, and threatens U.S. and Western progress.” Additionally, he notes that, “Russia’s pervasive propaganda, guised as information operations, seeks to actively undermine US influence and highlight anti-western narratives throughout Africa. These propaganda efforts are as much an impediment to US government access as its military operations.” He is further concerned that “Ultimately, Russia’s operations, activities, and investments complicate future US military and economic access and heighten the risk to U.S. national security interests in Africa.”[7]
It's noteworthy that General Anderson chose to emphasize the threat posed by the growing scale and scope of Chinese and Russian military activities in Africa. President Trump’s attitude toward China and Russia may sometimes be ambiguous, but General Anderson’s prepared remarks are quite clear. And since his remarks were written under the guidance of Defense Secretary Hegseth, they clearly express the president’s thinking.
This is also indicated by the questions that were addressed to General Anderson. The chairman of the committee, Senator Mike Wicker (Republican of Alabama) asked Anderson, “you talked about the activities of China in Africa. You talked about the activities of Russia under their dictator Vladimir Putin. Why do they do this? Are they helping Africa out of the goodness of their hearts?” Anderson responded, “I see from my time at Special Operations Command-Africa and my time in the Joint Staff that there is growing activity from both China and Russia on the continent. Both of these nations see their futures running through the continent and it is key to their strategy.”[8]
Senator Deb Fischer (Republican of Nebraska) asked Anderson, “what do you think are the greatest areas of threats that you’re going to have to focus on if you are confirmed.” Anderson responded by saying that “I think China does pose a significant threat to US interests on the continent. We have seen how they have used the Belt and Road Initiative to be a primarily economic focus in the past. We are seeing them expand into more information operations on the continent, providing the communist propaganda to the continent. We’re also seeing them engage in more military to military engagements, which is concerning. Also, looking at some of the infrastructure they’re looking to develop and ports that could become dual use are of concern, especially if they have something on the Atlantic. An Atlantic base of sea-based Chinese ships would greatly complicate our security picture at large.”[9]
Senator Ted Budd (Republican of North Carolina) asked Anderson “would you be willing to share with us some of your concerns in that area, particularly with PRC [People’s Republic of China] access to foreign ports in your area of responsibility?” Anderson said “as we’ve seen across the Indian Ocean into the AFRICOM area of responsibility, into the Atlantic, and even the Mediterranean, China is investing in ports globally. I think that should be of concern to us. I think it should be concerning to us, not only that they could potentially use those as dual use military ports, but what access can they deny US forces or US commerce as necessary in time of conflict. And so, I think that this is an absolute critical area that we need to understand and the vulnerabilities that may be posed by this. It doesn’t mean that we don’t believe in free commerce and economics, but at the same time, we need to understand our national security interests and what these may entail.”[10]
The Pentagon and American intelligence agencies have suggested for several years that China is seeking to establish a base for the People’s Liberation Army Navy on the west coast of Africa. This would potentially pose a direct threat to the US Second and Fourth Fleets in the Atlantic Ocean and would compel the Pentagon to divert personnel, ships, and other military resources from the Indo-Pacific Command into the Atlantic. However, there does not appear to be any credible evidence that the People’s Republic of China is genuinely trying to extend its naval presence into the Atlantic Ocean.
Additional information on the direction of US national security policy toward Africa under President Trump was provided in an earlier hearing. When General Michael Langley, US Marine Corps, the outgoing commander of AFRICOM made his final appearance before the House Armed Services Committee on “US Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Greater Middle East and Africa” on 10 June 2025, he declared that AFRICOM “is committed to and focused on safeguarding the homeland from threats emanating from Africa, protecting vital US interests by countering adversary efforts, and responding to crises across the African continent.” Africa, he said, “is a ‘nexis theater’—a continent where global interests converge.” It is “a continent from which the United States cannot afford to shift its gaze. It is imperative that we create conditions where terrorist organizations and malign actors are unable to threaten our homeland, while simultaneously creating conditions for American economic interests to flourish.”[11]
It's striking that General Langley explicitly identified “creating conditions for American economic interests to flourish” as one of AFRICOM’s priorities. This has always been one of AFRICOM’s principal missions, but defense officials rarely talk about it. It’s not clear where, how, or under what circumstances AFRICOM will pursue this objective. But it’s possible that AFRICOM might eventually be called upon by President Trump to play a role in the implementation of the “Minerals for Peace Deal” that he is trying to negotiate in central Africa.
In answer to a question from Ranking Member Adam Smith (Democrat of Washington) about “adjustments that we need to make in our posture,” General Langley replied that “there’s a lot of concerning aspects to Africa, but West Africa right now seems to be the most concerning. I mean it seems that the most capable terrorist organization is, you know, gaining influence in multiple countries and threatening others. We don’t have much of a presence there.”[12]
And when Representative Smith asked for his recommendations to contain that threat, General Langley said that “since we moved out of Niger, we had to reset our CT [counter-terrorism] strategy and that’s further engagement, especially with the coastal West African countries who are building capabilities and capacity to deter and in a number of countries it’s working, but JNIM [Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, the Union for supporting Islam and Muslims] and AQIM [Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb] and also ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] Sahel are really starting to get their footing and project themselves across the AES [Alliance des États du Sahel, the Alliance of Sahelian States] countries of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso.”[13]
General Langley warned that “without a persistent presence in the Sahel, we are limited in the ability to monitor the expanding influence of terrorist organizations in the region. Our assessment indicates that, if left unchecked, these organizations will continue to grow and their threat to regional stability, as well as to US national security interests, will only intensify.” Therefore, “we are increasing our efforts in intelligence sharing and information operations to monitor the growth of these groups and expanding relationships with willing partners elsewhere in West Africa like Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria.”[14]
Senator Tommy Tuberville (Republican of Alabama) asked Anderson to assess the impact of the expulsion of US troops conducting ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] operators from the base that the United States constructed in Agadez, Niger, in the Sahel, and “the future there.” Anderson described the construction of the base in Niger as “a significant investment” and “a key area for us to be able to monitor the threat.” So, “the loss of that is one that we’ll have to find creative ways to continue to get the indicators and warnings of what the terrorists are doing in that area.” He went on to say “that the relationships that we built in Niger with the military over several decades are still there. When the time is right, I believe there will be an opportunity, but that time will have to be determined and, if confirmed, I’ll look at what that is.” This signals that the Trump administration still hopes to resume security cooperation with the military regime in Niger, and the military juntas that have taken power in Burkina Faso and Mali as well.[15]
US security assistance to countries where units of the military have staged coup d’etats and seized power, including the Sahelian regimes, is currently prohibited under the terms of Section 7708 of the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations act. But, under the terms of a 2022 amendment to the legislation, the president now has the power to waive the section in the interests of US national security.
This past summer, two high-ranking members of the Trump administration visited the Sahel for talks with junta members, including mutual security concerns which likely included the possible resumption of US intelligence drone operations. They were Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for West Africa, William B. Stevens, and the National Security Council (NSC) specialist on counter-terrorism in Africa, Rudolph Atallah, a retired military officer with years of experience in Africa and in defense intelligence work who now serves under the director of counter-terrorism in the NSC, Sebastian Gorka.
These talks are unlikely to yield quick results for the Trump administration, particularly since Russian mercenaries from the new “Africa Corps” have been deployed by the Putin regime in all three Sahelian states and Russian companies have gained control of gold mines, and uranium and lithium deposits as well. And China has made lucrative arms sales to the Sahelian states, as well as the states of coastal west Africa, and has gained control of an important lithium mine in Mali which went into production in December 2024. But the level of attention that the Trump administration is already paying to these efforts shows that it is serious and that these efforts will continue. However, it is difficult to envisage how they can succeed, in the face of competition from Russia and China and given how dependent the military juntas are on their rhetorical commitments to defending national sovereignty and resisting Western domination.
Ranking Member Jack Reed (Democrat of Rhode Island) asked Anderson whether “in Somalia, do you think a continuous presence is essential?” Anderson said that “we’ve had a presence there for quite some time. We have seen some limited success there in training their forces. The Danab [Brigade] force is a capable counter-terrorism force. I do believe that that area is volatile. Al-Shabaab has shown the desire and will to attack the United States and United States interests. There’s increasing cooperation with the Houthis. So, I think it’s in our interests to have some level of engagement in that region.”[16]
Senator Jacky Rosen (Democrat of Nevada) asked Anderson to “share more about the growing partnership between the Houthis and al-Shabaab and the risk that it poses not only to the US equities, but personnel in the region and global shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.” Anderson said that having been “commander of Special Operations Command-Africa, I am well aware that the al-Qaeda affiliate, that al-Shabaab is fully intent, has full intent to attack US interests in the US homeland, if they can build the capability. The concern is that cooperation now across the Red Sea with the Houthis who are backed by the Iranians, and what that could mean and give them the capability not just have the will, but now the capability to attack the US or US interests in a more robust way. And again, the Houthis and al-Shabaab operate in critical terrain for the United States and for global shipping and so they’ve the means for them to disrupt that and have impact on our interests is significant. So, we need to do everything we can to stop that partnership.”[17]
Again, there is no credible publicly-available evidence that al-Shabaab intends to attack the United States. But, in the context of Houthi attacks on Israel and on ships in the Red Sea, the Trump administration has significantly escalated US military operations in Somalia. During his trip to the AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, in January 2025, Defense Secretary Hegseth signed a directive from President Trump authorizing the commander of AFRICOM to launch airstrikes and commando raids on his own authority, without waiting for presidential approval.[18] And so far this year, AFRICOM has launched more than 50 airstrikes in Somalia against al-Shabaab and ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] Somalia targets.[19]
And finally, Senator Tom Cotton (Republican of Arkansas) asked Anderson, “given your current role and also the threat of drone attacks from terrorist groups, in your future role, what are your thoughts” on “how drones are changing the modern battlefield?’ Anderson replied. “We are at a critical inflection point in history. Much like the industrial age matured in the early 20th century, the digital age is maturing now.” So, “we have to take this very seriously. Not just taking on the drone operations, but also what do we do to counter them and defend against them. This is a grave concern for me as I look at the African continent as there are vulnerabilities out there for our forces, but it’s also a vulnerability for our partners as well. And, I guess I should say it’s not just potential terrorist groups. It’s also potential insurgencies, uprisings, clashes of the kind that we see with unfortunate frequency in Africa as well.”[20]
Senator Cotton’s inquiry reflects the growing concern among political leaders, defense officials, and others about the impact of aerial drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles—as well as unmanned ships, submarines, tanks, and other vehicles of various types—on contemporary warfare. The United States, like many countries, is frantically engaged in efforts to develop technology to detect drone attacks and protect their forces. But drones are comparatively inexpensive to acquire and simple to operate. As General Anderson says, AFRICOM now has to face the prospect of drone attacks, not just if it engages in combat with major jihadist groups, but also from armed insurgent groups like the Tuareg organizations in the Sahel or any of the numerous militias fighting in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, or criminal organizations like those now active in Nigeria, or popular uprisings and communal violence.
President Trump’s nomination of General Anderson as the next commander of AFRICOM was confirmed by the full US Senate on 31 July 2025 by unanimous voice vote.[21] His testimony, taken together with the testimony of General Langley, presents as clear a picture of the role that AFRICOM will play in President Trump’s second term as we are likely to see.
General Langley and General Anderson identified four key missions for AFRICOM under President Trump:
· To deter and fight terrorists and insurgent groups, particularly those which pose a threat to the US homeland and US interests on the continent
· To counter the growth of China’s economic, political, and military power in Africa
· To counter Russia’s efforts to exploit instability in Africa to advance their global financial and geo-political objectives
· To create conditions favorable to increased US private investment in Africa and to maintain US access to strategic raw materials from the continent
None of these missions is entirely new.[22] They are precisely why President George W. Bush created AFRICOM in October 2007,[23] in the aftermath of the al-Qaeda attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 and the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. But AFRICOM was designed to work in coordination with other US government agencies, including the Agency for International Development and the Voice of America. And it was intended to support multilateral peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations, France, the European Union, the African Union, and regional African organizations.
Now, all these agencies have been dismantled and all US funding for peacekeeping operations has been terminated.[24] President Trump still has other tools at his disposal besides military training programs, arms sales, and direct military intervention; these include tariffs and sanctions. But since the Trump administration has few economic incentives or legal measures to employ, these are unlikely to succeed. So, AFRICOM will play an increasingly central role in US national security policy toward Africa.
This Commentary was first published at Pambazuka News
About an Author
Daniel Volman is the Director of the African Security Research Project (www.africansecurity.org) and a specialist on US national security policy toward Africa and African security issues. He received his Ph.D. in African History from the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1991. His articles have been published in Pambazuka News, the New York Times, the Bulletin of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars, the Journal of Modern African Studies, the Review of African Political Economy, the Washington Blade, and AllAfrica.Com, and he has been interviewed by the Voice of America, the BBC, and al-Jazeera.
Endnotes
[1] US Department of Defense, “Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Holds Media Availability in Stuttgart, Germany, 12 February 2025” accessed at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4064276/defense-secretary-pete-hegseth-holds-media-availability-in-stuttgart-germany/
[2] US Department of Defense, “Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Holds Media Availability in Stuttgart, Germany, 12 February 2025” accessed at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4064276/defense-secretary-pete-hegseth-holds-media-availability-in-stuttgart-germany/
[3] US Department of Defense, “Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Holds Media Availability in Stuttgart, Germany, 12 February 2025” accessed at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/4064276/defense-secretary-pete-hegseth-holds-media-availability-in-stuttgart-germany/
[4] Senate Armed Services Committee, “Written Statement of Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, United States Air Force to be General and Commander, United States Africa Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 22 July 2025,” accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/anderson_opening_statement1.pdf
[5] Senate Armed Services Committee, Written Statement of Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, United States Air Force to be General and Commander, United States Africa Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 22 July 2025,” accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/anderson_opening_statement1.pdf
[6] Senate Armed Services Committee, “Written Statement of Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, United States Air Force to be General and Commander, United States Africa Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 22 July 2025,” accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/anderson_opening_statement1.pdf
[7] Senate Armed Services Committee, “Written Statement of Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, United States Air Force to be General and Commander, United States Africa Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 22 July 2025,” accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/anderson_opening_statement1.pdf
[8] Senate Armed Services Committee “Hearing to consider the nominations of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley, USN to be admiral and Commander, United States Special Operations Command; and Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, USAF to be general and Commander, United States Africa Command, Tuesday, July 22, 2025,” accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-consider-the-nominations-of-vice-admiral-frank-m-bradley-usn-to-be-admiral-and_commander-united-states-special-operations-command-and-lieutenant-general-dagvin-rm-anderson-usaf-to-be-general-and--commander-united-states-africa-command
[9] Senate Armed Services Committee “Hearing to consider the nominations of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley, USN to be admiral and Commander, United States Special Operations Command; and Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, USAF to be general and Commander, United States Africa Command, Tuesday, July 22, 2025,” accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-consider-the-nominations-of-vice-admiral-frank-m-bradley-usn-to-be-admiral-and_commander-united-states-special-operations-command-and-lieutenant-general-dagvin-rm-anderson-usaf-to-be-general-and--commander-united-states-africa-command
[10] Senate Armed Services Committee “Hearing to consider the nominations of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley, USN to be admiral and Commander, United States Special Operations Command; and Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, USAF to be general and Commander, United States Africa Command, Tuesday, July 22, 2025,” accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-consider-the-nominations-of-vice-admiral-frank-m-bradley-usn-to-be-admiral-and_commander-united-states-special-operations-command-and-lieutenant-general-dagvin-rm-anderson-usaf-to-be-general-and--commander-united-states-africa-command
[11] House Armed Services Committee, “Statement of General Michael E. Langley, United States Marine Corps, Commander, United States Africa Command, Before the House Armed Services Committee, 10 June 2025, “ accessed at https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2025_africom_posture_statement_for_hasc.pdf
[12] House Armed Services Committee, “U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Greater Middle East and Africa. June 10, 2025,” accessed at https://armedservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=5182
[13] House Armed Services Committee, “U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Greater Middle East and Africa. June 10, 2025,” accessed at https://armedservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=5182
[14] House Armed Services Committee, “U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Greater Middle East and Africa. June 10, 2025,” accessed at https://armedservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=5182
[15] Senate Armed Services Committee “Hearing to consider the nominations of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley, USN to be admiral and Commander, United States Special Operations Command; and Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, USAF to be general and Commander, United States Africa Command, Tuesday, July 22, 2025,” accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-consider-the-nominations-of-vice-admiral-frank-m-bradley-usn-to-be-admiral-and_commander-united-states-special-operations-command-and-lieutenant-general-dagvin-rm-anderson-usaf-to-be-general-and--commander-united-states-africa-command
[16] Senate Armed Services Committee “Hearing to consider the nominations of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley, USN to be admiral and Commander, United States Special Operations Command; and Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, USAF to be general and Commander, United States Africa Command, Tuesday, July 22, 2025,” accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-consider-the-nominations-of-vice-admiral-frank-m-bradley-usn-to-be-admiral-and_commander-united-states-special-operations-command-and-lieutenant-general-dagvin-rm-anderson-usaf-to-be-general-and--commander-united-states-africa-command
[17] Senate Armed Services Committee “Hearing to consider the nominations of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley, USN to be admiral and Commander, United States Special Operations Command; and Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, USAF to be general and Commander, United States Africa Command, Tuesday, July 22, 2025,” accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-consider-the-nominations-of-vice-admiral-frank-m-bradley-usn-to-be-admiral-and_commander-united-states-special-operations-command-and-lieutenant-general-dagvin-rm-anderson-usaf-to-be-general-and--commander-united-states-africa-command
[18] James LaPorta, “Trump eases rules on military raids and airstrikes, expanding range of who can be targeted,” CBS News, 28 February 2025, accessed at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-eases-rules-military-raids-airstrikes-targets/
[19] John Vandiver, “Somalia sees sharp rise in US strikes against ISIS and al-Shabab,” Stars and Stripes, 28 July 28 2025 accessed at https://www.stripes.com/theaters/africa/2025-07-28/africom-somalia-air-strikes-18583199.html
[20] Senate Armed Services Committee “Hearing to consider the nominations of Vice Admiral Frank M. Bradley, USN to be admiral and Commander, United States Special Operations Command; and Lieutenant General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, USAF to be general and Commander, United States Africa Command, Tuesday, July 22, 2025,” accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-consider-the-nominations-of-vice-admiral-frank-m-bradley-usn-to-be-admiral-and_commander-united-states-special-operations-command-and-lieutenant-general-dagvin-rm-anderson-usaf-to-be-general-and--commander-united-states-africa-command
[21] Svetlana Shkolnikova, “ Senate confirms new Navy CNO, commanders of AFRICOM and SOCOM,” Stars and Stripes, 1 August 2025, accessed at https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2025-08-01/africom-socom-navy-cno-confirmed-senate-18636391.html
[22] Daniel Volman, “US to Create New Regional Military Command for Africa: AFRICOM, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 34, No. 114, (December 2007), accessed at https://www.jstor.org/stable/20406460?seq=1
[23] Daniel Volman, “Send more guns: Biden’s Fiscal Year 2024 budget plan for Africa,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 51, No. 179, (May 2024), accessed at https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.62191/ROAPE-2024-0004
[24] Daniel Volman, “President Trump’s FY 2026 Military Aid Budget Request For Africa,” Eurasia Review, 3 June 2025, accessed at https://www.eurasiareview.com/03062025-president-trumps-fy-2026-military-aid-budget-request-for-africa-oped/