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As the global powers compete for the control over vital trade routes and resource networks, the relationship between Africa and the Asia-Pacific is entering a high-stakes era, particularly centring the Indian Ocean.
We interviewed international risk consultant and geopolitical analyst Bahauddin Foizee to break down what this shift means for the next decade. In this interview, Foizee maps out the new forces driving South-South cooperation—from the scramble for Africa's critical minerals to escalating maritime security threats.
Kabelo Molefe/ Center for Geopolitics and International Policy: The Indian Ocean effectively bridges Africa and the Asia-Pacific. What are the primary maritime security and piracy risks that joint naval initiatives between these two regions must address over the next decade?
Bahauddin Foizee: The Indian Ocean is the primary maritime bridge connecting the African continent and the Asia-Pacific region. From my strategic perspective, joint naval initiatives between these two regions over the next decade must move past traditional localized policing to counter highly sophisticated asymmetric threats.
We are seeing a convergence of traditional piracy, which has evolved from low-tech hijackings to heavily armed and coordinated transnational networks, with modern geopolitical proxy conflicts. The primary risk centres on vital choke points like the Bab-el-Mandeb, the Mozambique Channel and the Gulf of Aden. Joint deployments must address the proliferation of low-cost loitering munitions, sea-skimming drones and sea mines deployed by non-state actors. These asymmetric threats can choke global sea lines of communication (SLOCs) instantly, making real-time intelligence sharing and multi-national naval interoperability between Asian powers and East African littoral states non-negotiable for trade continuity.
KM/ CGIP: How is the race for critical minerals and rare earth elements in Africa reshaping the investment and diplomatic strategies of major Asia-Pacific economies?
BF: The accelerating global transition toward the defence-tech modernization and the green infrastructure has sparked an intense competitive race for Africa’s critical minerals and rare earth elements. The major Asia-Pacific economies like Indonesia, Japan and South Korea are aggressively reshaping their diplomatic and investment strategies to challenge Beijing’s historical dominance over African supply chains.
These Asian middle powers are utilizing targeted state-backed capital, instead of relying purely on open-market purchases. Japan and South Korea are deploying long-term equity investments and technology-transfer partnerships directly into mining infrastructures in nations like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Namibia to secure exclusive off-take agreements for cobalt, lithium and copper.
KM/ CGIP: How do you forecast the growth of South-South cooperation frameworks (like an expanded BRICS or IORA) affecting traditional Western economic dominance in East and Southern Africa?
BF: From a strictly political affairs vantage point, the expansion of South-South institutional cooperation frameworks, such as an expanded BRICS bloc and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), is fundamentally reshaping the geopolitical architecture of East and Southern Africa.
This shift provides the African state actors with greater diplomatic leverage and a broader range of strategic options. By engaging with non-Western multilateral forums, the African governments can diversify their sources of development finance and reduce their reliance on the traditional institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, while maintaining their existing economic relationships with Western partners. Instead of signalling a withdrawal from the Western-led economic order, this development reflects a gradual redistribution of economic influence towards a more multipolar system. It also enables the African countries to expand direct trade, explore alternative payment and currency settlement mechanisms, and strengthen security dialogues with the fast-growing Asia-Pacific economies, thereby enhancing their capacity to pursue national interests and negotiate partnerships on more favourable terms.
However, the extent of this transformation will depend on whether these frameworks can move beyond diplomatic alignment and towards meaningful economic integration. The competing national interests and the disparities in bargaining power may constrain collective action, while African countries must ensure that new partnerships deliver tangible developmental gains, instead of merely reproducing the existing patterns of unequal exchange.
At the same time, the traditional Western economic powers are likely to remain influential in the region’s geopolitical and economic landscape. The extent to which the South-South cooperation can reshape these dynamics will ultimately depend on whether the African governments can translate their expanded diplomatic options into meaningful economic integration and sustainable development.
KM/ CGIP: From a planetary risk perspective, how can shared climate vulnerabilities—such as rising sea levels and agricultural disruptions—be translated into collaborative policy defence frameworks between South Asian and East African coastal states?
BF: While I not an environmental scientist, I do understand the social science behind the environmental developments. My forecasting models emphasize that shared planetary risks must be treated as structural drivers for cross-continental policy defence alignments. Both South Asian littoral states and East African coastal nations face similar vulnerabilities, particularly rising sea levels, devastating cyclical cyclones and acute agricultural disruptions.
Through platforms like IORA, these regions are beginning to move past symbolic environmental pacts toward concrete security coordination. This includes establishing joint early-warning systems, building integrated maritime disaster-response centres, and collaborating on coastal resilience engineering. By reframing climate vulnerability from a localized humanitarian crisis into a shared and systemic threat to maritime borders and food security, these states are building a unique cross-continental defence framework aimed at preserving regional stability against planetary shocks.
KM/ CGIP: As African free trade areas (like the AfCFTA) integrate the continent's markets, what specific manufacturing or digital services sectors in the Asia-Pacific are best positioned to capitalize on this cross-continental expansion?
BF: As the AfCFTA progressively integrates Africa into the world’s largest unified free trade zone, the forward-looking economic sectors within the Asia-Pacific are uniquely positioned to capitalize on this massive cross-continental commercial space.
Instead of viewing Africa merely as an exporter of raw commodities, the advanced Asian enterprises are shifting toward localized manufacturing and digital service integration. Asia-Pacific automotive, pharmaceutical and light-industrial conglomerates are establishing assembly hubs directly within AfCFTA member states to secure duty-free access across the entire continent. Simultaneously, South Asian and East Asian fintech and digital telecommunications providers are aggressively exporting mobile-banking infrastructures and digital services to anchor themselves into Africa's rapidly expanding consumer market.
Journalist Kabelo Molefe conducted this interview.